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REORGANIZATIONS UNDER SECTION 11(g) OF THE
PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT
THE Public Utility Holding Company Act' was passed by Congress in
1935 to provide protection for investors in public utilities and their sub-
sidiaries. 2 Appreciating the fact that danger to this group lay more perhaps
in the readjustment of already existing rights than in the creation of new
rights by security flotations, Congress subjected the process of public utility
This Comment is based exclusively upon information derived from the published
releases of the SEC up to and including Holding Company Act Release No. 1749,
October 11, 1939. Nothing herein may properly be taken as an expression of opinion
of the Commission or any of its officials.
1. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §79 (Supp. 1938).
2. A good discussion of how closely the SEC has fulfilled this purpose in their
first three years of administration is contained in Mfeck and Cary, Regudation of Cor-
porate Finance and Management under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
.935 (1938) 52 HARv. L. REv. 216. For the need for such regulation, see Dodd, Ame-nding
the Securities Act-American Bar Association Comnittee's Proposals (1935) 45 Yn=
L. _. 199.
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reorganization to a separate and stringent control.3 The Act makes approval
by the Securities and Exchange Commission a condition precedent to the
issue of new securities or to changes in the investors' existing rights.4 If such
proposals are not made in connection with a "reorganization plan," Section
12(e) requires that a solicitation of consents be preceded or accompanied by
the proponent's statement concerning the purpose of the intended issue or
change.5 Where the project touches the reorganization of a registered holding
company or subsidiary, however, Section 11 (g) stipulates that the plan must
be accompanied by a Commission report, rather than a statement by the
proponents.0 This section further declares that a solicitation for proxies,
consents, authorizations, or dissents for a "reorganization plan" is itself un-
lawful, unless the proposal has been suggested by the Commission or sub-
mitted to it by a person having a bona fide interest in the reorganization.'
Since the Commission report is required only for "plans of reorganization,"
the Commission cannot demand compliance with Section 11 (g) until it finds
that the proposed adjustment is, in fact, a reorganization. Treatises and
texts can provide little assistance in this determination, for the writers have
been unable to agree upon a definition. Depending upon the source chosen,
authority can be found for describing a reorganization as any adjustment of
either the corporation's financial structure or the control provided the various
3. With few exceptions, no state or federal machinery provided for a hearing on
the fairness and equity of a voluntary reorganization plan until the Holding Company
Act was enacted. This protectioh is still unavailable to shareholders of a company not
within the Act. See Comment (1939) 33 ILL. L. REV. 914, 932; (1939) 52 HARV. L.
REv. 1331, 1334. The Chandler Act has increased the powers of both the courts and the
SEC over involuntary reorganization plans. Legis. (1934) 34 CoL. L. Ray. 1348; Dodd,
The Securities and Exchange Commission Reform Program for Bankruptcy Reorganta-
tlions (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 223; Weiner, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Reorganization (1938) 38 CoL. L. Ray. 280; Clark, The Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Chandler Act (1939) 73 U. S. L. RaV. 147.
4. 49 STAT. 815 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §79(g) (Supp. 1938); see (1937) 46 YALE
L. J. 1058 for the administration of this provision.
5. Under the authority granted by Section 12(e), the SEC has incorporated into
this section all the rules and regulations governing solicitations which were formulated
under Section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act. SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 759 (1937).
6. Section 11(g) is applicable to solicitations, proxies, etc. in respect of a reor-
ganization or dissolution plan of a registered holding company or subsidiary, only when
the solicitation is made by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce. Campaigns by personal contacts, house to house canvass, and possibly
intrastate commerce are permissible without compliance.
7. The proposal must be accompanied by adequate information regarding it and
its sponsors. This information is then conveyed to the security holders in the report
on the plan by the Commission. Under the authority granted by Section 11(g) the
Commission has promulgated a set of rules governing the form and content of the
solicitations and the applications for Commission reports. Rules 12E-3 to 6, SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 759 (1937).
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security classes.8 In its narrowest construction, a reorganization has been
defined as the adjustments of a corporation's financial structure necessitated
by threatened or actual insolvency.0 Nor can previous judicial interpretations
of the scope of reorganization within the meaning of tax or bankruptcy
statutes provide "binding" precedent for deciding the ambit of regulation
by Section 11(g) for this section serves a function entirely distinct from that
contemplated by tax and bank-ruptcy statutes. The definition set forth in the
Revenue Acts' 0 has significance only with the realization that its limited
range was designed to prevent tax evasion, since gains from reorganizations,
as there used, are tax-exempt." In this context, a reorganization must con-
tain an element of change of control or the process must resemble a merger
or consolidation. Chapter X of the Chandler Act,12 on the other hand, is
concerned mainly with affording relief to corporate debtors without unduly
jeopardizing the claims of creditors.'3 Section 21614 therefore requires that
a reorganization shall include a modification or alteration of creditors' rights.
The purpose of Section 11(g), however, was to acquaint security holders
with the facts of suggested changes in order that they might intelligently
exercise their right to assent to or dissent from the proposal.15 It is apparent
that Congress did not intend the provision to be restricted to changes in
control or in creditors' rights. Rather, it left reorganization undefined so
that the Commission could later mark out within the legal limits the most
practical area of definition.
Since the concern of Section 11(g) is the dissemination of solicitations,
no problems relating to the application of this section arise if the reorgan-
ization may be consummated without the solicitation of consent,. Its require-
ments may be ignored, therefore, where the transaction does not necessitate
the vote of any class of security holders despite resultant changes in their
S. Cf., for example, Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 229 Wisc. 565, 280 N. NV. 61S
(1938) ; Utility Investing Corp. v. Stuart, 11 F. Supp. 391 (E. D. Pa. 1934), aff'd, 78 F.
(2d) 279 (C. C.A. 3d, 1935); Mowrry v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 76 Fed. 33
(C.C.A. 7th, 1896).
9. See BouvrER, LAw DxcrioNA r; CRAVATH, SO=E LEGAL Pirsrs or Cowxna
FINAcIrNG, REORGANIZATION P-GULATIoN (Stetson ed. 1917) 154; DnWrN, FnW:-
cur. PoLicy OF CoRPoRATio~s (3d rev. ed. 1934) 1033.
10. 49 STAT. 1678 (1936), reenacted, 52 STAT. 485, 26 U. S. C. § 112(g)(1) (Supp.
1938), as amended by Pub. L. No. 1, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 10, 1939).
11. See Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 134.
12. 52 STAT. 883-905, 11 U. S. C. §§ 501-676 (Supp. 1933).
13. See Rostow and Cutler, Competing Systemis of Corporate Reorganization:
Chapters X and XI of the Bankrtptcy Act (1939) 43 YALE, L. J. 1334.
14. 52 STAT. 895, 11 U. S. C. § 616 (Supp. 193S).
15. SEN. RE,. No. 613, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 34; see Utilities Elkhom Coal
Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1200 (1938) 5; Meck and Cary, Regulatian
of Corporate Finance and Managenent wnder the Public Utility Holding Comptany Act
of 1935 (1938) 52 HAnv. L. Rnv. 216, 242; cf. SEcuriTrES A ,D ExnAC1GE ComIussION,
SEcoxD ANNUAL REPORT (1936) 19.
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control or rights.-; Since charter provisions usually authorize purchases and
sales of assets or securities of operating companies without the express vote
of the holding company's shareholders, such dealings would require no Com-
mission report.17 Similarly, mergers and recapitalizations of subsidiary com-
panies may be effectuated without reference to Section- 11(g) where one
holding company owns all the securities of the subsidiary which are qualified
to vote upon the proposed combination or classification.' 8
Beyond, this frontier of manifest exclusions, the Commission has seen fit
to articulate the limits of Section 11(g) by implication rather than direct
pronouncement. In conformance with its desire to formulate a policy which
will be a product of practical experience, the Commission has been somewhat
noncommittal in defining a reorganization plan as "any plan of reorgan-
ization of a registered holding company or any subsidiary of such company,
which plan is subject to the provisions of Section 11 (g) of the Act."' 1 While
this mimicry has enabled the Commission to examine each project as a sul
generis transaction, it has not enlightened proponents of various corporate
changes. Unless the Commission has previously declared that similar measures
constitute a reorganization, the proponent is confronted by a parrot, not a
16. A declaration of stock dividends is thus outside the regulations of Section 11(g).
See General Public Utilities, Inc., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 889 (1937) ;
Amarillo Gas Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1506 (1939). Compliance
with Rule 12C-2 and Section 7 is all that is required even if the dividend is to be paid
out of capital or unearned surplus. Commonwealth Gas & Electric Cos., SEC Holding
Company Act Release No. 945 (1937). It is immaterial that the dividends are to be
paid in the stock of subsidiary corporations. Penn Western Gas & Electric Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 1046 (1938). But if the proposed dividend of sub-
sidiaries' stock completely divests the holding company of its assets, the solicitation
for proxies must comply with Section 11(g), not because it is a reorganization, but
because it is a dissolution. Massachusetts Lighting Cos., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 961 (1938) ; ef. Penn Western Gas & Electric Co., SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 1356 (1938).
17. See Southern Natural Gas Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 682
(1937); Middle West Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1005 (1938).
18. Republic Electric Power Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1270
(1938); North Dakota Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Release No. 1577
(1939). Commission approval, of course, must be obtained before these steps may be
taken, unless the company has applied for and been granted a plenary exemption from
the Act. Although such an exemption relieves the corporation from performance in
accordance with the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act may still place the transaction within Commission "control."
See § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 895(a), 15 U.S,C.
78(n) (a) (1934).
19. Rule 12E-1, SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 759 (1937). In fairness
to the Commission it should be noted that the Act gives them no authority to define
the term. The Commission therefore determined to treat as reorganizations any plans
which they thought were intended to be enclosed by Section 11(g). The Commission
has defined a reorganization for purposes of the Securities Act of 1933. Form E-1,
C.C.H. Sec. Act Serv. [7231 (1939).
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definition. In determining whether to submit to the requirements of Section
11 (g), the proponent must consider the possibility that a candid Commission
report may cast unfavorable light upon the proposal. Against this appraisal
and the realization that submission will delay the consummation of a plan,
he must weigh the threat of potential prosecution if he should proceed, with-
out a Commission report, to solicit proxies or assents for a plan which the
Commission later recognized as a reorganization.
Although the Commission's authoritative definition is too nebulous to
assist a perplexed proponent, a review of the plans submitted under Section
1l(g) 2° disclose that the Commission has selected a fairly precise standard
for determining whether a given adjustment is a reorganization within the
meaning of that section. A "plan of reorganization" for this purpose is any
proposal to exchange securities which contemplates a revision of rights of
the security holder directly related to his dividend or liquidation interests ;21
and this change must be such that a requisite vote cast in its favor will bind
all members of the affected class. It is immaterial whether the measure
affects one class of securities2 2 or all of them, but unless the class affected
must give its consent23 by proxy or positive vote, the proposal is not within
Section 11 (g).
While reorganizations promulgated for public utility holding companies
and subsidiaries in connection with relief sought under 77B or the Chandler
Act are undoubtedly included within this definition,2 the provisions of Section
11 (g) are not limited to bankruptcy reorganizations or manipulations to
defer impending insolvency. If the section were so confined, its value would
be slight indeed, for the usual voluntary reorganization occurs not by a cor-
poration in extremis, but by one which desires to reduce its fixed obligations.p
This type of reorganization is, for the most part, conceived and sponsored
20. As revealed by the Public Utility Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 1-1749
(1935-1939).
21. Issues of securities, regulated by Section 7, may have an indirect effect upln
dividend or liquidation interests, but such plans are not reorganizations unless the issue
is accompanied by an exchange which would have a direct relation to dividend or
liquidation interests. Note issues: Gardner Electric Light Co., SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 831 (1937) ; Gulf States Utility Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release
No. 1446 (1939). Stock issues: Page Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release
No. 1216 (1938); Amarillo Gas Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1.fO5
(1939). Bond issues: Wisconsin Public Service Corp., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 1230 (193); Kansas Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 1656 (1939).
272. Security is here used as defined by Section 2(16) of the Act: Any note, draft,
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, etc.
23. Or e-xpress disapproval by dissent.
24. See note 14, supra.
25. REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE " No-, AcTiTrs, PzM.Zo N.EL,
A-D FucNoNs OF Pomcrrvz AN REoRGANrzATIoN Co nrrn- s (1936-1939) pt. VII,
6. (Hereafter referred to as Protective Committee Reports).
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by bankers and management, 26 and is the type where investor protection is
most needed.2 7 Each security holder who is entitled to a vote must be clearly
informed of the reasons for the change and its effect upon his security so
that he may intelligently exercise his franchise. While it is true that regard-
less of Section 11(g), Section 12(e) requires that solicitations be accom-
panied by a declaration listing the proponents of the change, their interest
and their purpose, the statement would be one prepared by the declarant.
In public utility holding companies especially, the fact that the report is
the proponent's rather than the Commission's is significant.28 As the cor-
porate structure becomes more complex, with one holding company con-
trolling several intermediaries which in turn control others, on down to the
ultimate operating companies, the capitalization tends to increase in com-
plexity. It becomes difficult for the unskilled to determine the effect of a
particular change upon his class of security. The proponent's report may
be accurate, but accuracy which increases confusion is not especially helpful.
A Commission report, on the other hand, is designed to present the probable
results of the project as simply and as comprehensibly as possible, although
the complexity of some of the reports submitted raises the question whether
such an objective is fully attainable. While recommending neither the accep-
tance nor rejection of a plan, the Commission attempts to afford the voter an
opportunity to choose between the proposed reorganization and any other
alternative.
29
If either the corporate charter, trust indenture or state statute requires
that any class of security holders consent to a reorganization plan,80 a Com-
mission report must accompany the solicitation for their proxies. The most
common proposal for which such a Commission report has been issued is the
recapitalization plan involving a reclassification or conversion of securities.
26. Protective Committee Reports, pt. VII, 2.
27. A detailed exposition of the exchange inducements and pressure devices which
accompany management's control of the proxy machine occur in Protective Committee
Reports, pt. VII, 266-294, 413-415; see also, Fortas, The Securities Act and Corporate
Reorganizations (1937) 4 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 218, 227. For the plight of the small
investor in an insolvent company, see BAILLE, INVESTMENT COMPANy REGULATION (a
statement before the SEC, July 16, 1937).
28. The incompleteness of the investor protection afforded by Section 12(e) is
disclosed in Comment (1939) 33 ILL. L. REv. 914. See also Bresnahan, Will Provisions
of Chandler Act Extending SEC Powers Afford Adequate Protection to Corporate
Investors? (1938) A 1 CoRP. Rzoaa. & AmER. BAxKL. Rrv. 342.
29. For an example of a report, see Report on Reorganization Plan for International
Paper and Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 641 (1937). A hope-
lessly complicated report appears in American Gas & Power Co. and Birmingham Gas
Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1257 (1938); see Meek and Cary, Regu-
lation of Corporate Finance and Management under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 5935 (1938) 52 HARv. L. REv. 216, 246, n. 72.
30. The requirements for particular corporate changes are set forth in Protective
Committee Reports, pt. VII, 464-525.
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Although these proposals vary in detail, they conform on the whole to a
general pattern whose predominant theme is either a partial or complete
exchange of securities for those of a junior class.31 A simplified example
of this process is the exchange of bonds for preferred stock either partially
or wholly, and/or the exchange of preferred for common either partially
or wholly, and/or the extinction of common either partially or wholly.P- A
plan of this type clearly contemplates an exchange of securities which directly
affects those stockholder rights related to dividend or liquidation interestsSp
Another popular reorganization disclosed by the Commission releases is
the reclassification plan which proposes the surrender of preferred stock for
stock of lower par or stated value.34 Since its orthodox purpose is to reduce
fixed dividend charges, it is usually accompanied by a reduction in the divi-
dend rate. This is certainly an exchange of securities, even though a literal
exchange may never occur.35 The old security may be merely stamped to
record the alteration, but an exchange of securities has in fact occurred.
For his old stock of par $100 the preferred holder now possesses a new
security, albeit the same paper, of par $50. The change in liquidation inter-
ests is manifest, since the new issue 30 entities the owner to a smaller pro-
portion of the corporation's liquidated assets.
While proposals to modify the par or stated value of preferred have been
recognized by the Commission as reorganization plans, similar alterations
31. See American Gas & Power Co. and Birmingham Gas Co., SEC Holding
Company Act Release Nos. 1256, 1257 (1933); Mountain States Power Co., SEC Hold-
ing Company Act Release No. 1650 (1939). The Commission has held that where a
plan of reorganization contemplates the issuance of securities Section 7 must be complied
with. See Illinois Power & Light Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 634
(1937): American Gas & Power Co. and Birmingham Gas Co., SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 1256 (1933).
32. For variations on this theme, see SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nol.
796 (1937), 876 (1937), 973 (1938), 1090 (1938), 1139 (1938), 1271 (193S), 1312 (1933),
and 1495 (1939).
33. Alterations in voting rights which are protected by the requirements of Section
7 are not considered reorganizations because the effect of such modifications on dividend
or liquidation interests are too remote. See North American Co., SEC Holding Com-
pany Act Release No. 1427 (1939) ; Peoples Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 1664 (1939). An excellent illustration because of the separate treat-
ment of declarations under Sections 7 and 11 may be found in Engineers Public Service
Co.. SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1160 (1938). The addition of a conversion
privilege to preferred's rights has also been considered too indirect a change of liquida-
tion and dividend interests to warrant submission to Section 11(g). See Northern States
Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 874 (1937).
34. See SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 414 (193); Illinois Power &
Light Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 58,2 (1937).
35. Cf. note 49, infra.
36. Such an alteration would be a stock issue. SEC v. Associated Gas Co., 95 F.
(2d) 795 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), (1938) 48 YALE L. 3. 149.
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for common do not require compliance with Section 11(g).31 This apparent
inconsistency is resolved by the factual distinction inhering in the results
of the two transactions. Unlike preferred, a change in the par or stated
value of common has no effect upon its participation in liquidation, since
common, regardless of its par or stated value, shares pro rata in the remain-
ing assets after all other claims have been satisfied.38 Nor does the alteration
directly influence the dividends received by common.30 Total profits available
for dividends being constant, the dividend rate will vary inversely with the
change in par value, leaving each holder's dividends unmodified. Such a plan
might indirectly affect the divident rights of preferred by increasing potential
dividends, but the alteration in their rights would be immaterial so long as
preferred had no vote on the proposal. Even if the certificate of incorpora-
tion guaranteed the preferred a vote, the proposal would still not be a reor-
ganization, since the contemplated change would not result in a direct modi-
fication of the preferred dividend rights. 40 Where the only alteration con-
templated, however, is the complete extinction of common, the proposal
becomes a reorganization if the common is entitled to a vote.41 In such a
case, the holders of common are conceived to be exchanging their right to
potential dividends and liquidation proceeds, even though they are receiving
nothing in return.
42
37. Changes in stated value of common: Columbia Gas & Electric Co., SEC Holding
Company Act Release No. 1417 (1939); New York and Richmond Gas Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 1442 (1939); Edison Sault Electric Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 1705 (1939). Changes in par value of common:
American Public Service Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 538 (1937);
Ohio Fuel Gas Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1720 (1939); Huntington
Development & Gas Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1721 (1939).
38. This may be altered by charter requirements or where the preferred is par-
ticipating as to assets. In practically all charters, however, there are one or more classes
of stock which in liquidation must wait until all other claims have been satisfied. A
change in the par or stated value of such securities would not modify their liquidation
value.
39. Common's equity is not affected by an amendment to the certificate of incor-
poration establishing a fund for earned surplus which must reach a set amount before
payment of any dividends to common. A proposal to create such a cushion, therefore,
has not been considered by the Commission to be within the regulations of Section 11(g).
North American Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1427 (1939).
40. See Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
1243 (1938).
41. Of course, compliance with Section 11(g) is not necessary so far as common
is concerned unless common still has equity in the corporation, entitling it to a vote.
See the Chandler Act §§ 137, 179, and 216(8). 52 STAT. 887, 892, and 895, 11 U. S. C.
§§537, 579, and 616(8) (Supp. 1938).
42. See Northern States Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1355
(1938); also SEC Holding Company Act Release 1267 (1938), and Northern States
Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1471 (1939). This proposal could
not secure the necessary consent of the common shareholder, unless they also owned
preferred, the value of which would be increased.
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Mergers and consolidations are dearly reorganizations when accomplished
by the exchange of securities, although the securities exchanged may not
differ in pecuniary value.43 But, if Corporation A merges with Corporation
B by buying the stock of B for cash, the transaction is not a reorganization
so far as the stockholders of B are concerned, since there has been no
exchange of securities. 44 If unification into a new corporate entity is con-
templated, the process would be a reorganization as applied to the stock-
holders of A, since their stock in the old corporation would in fact be ex-
changed for the securities of the new.45 Where the holding company seeks
to affect a merger by offering to exchange securities with investors who own
shares of a subsidiary's stock, there need be no compliance with Section
11(g).46 This proposal has not been included within the ambit of reor-
ganization activity, because the method of effectuating the change contains
none of the customary corporate sanctions embodied in the principle of
majority rule.47 The charter or statutes usually stipulate that a corporate
change will be binding upon approval by a requisite number of stockholders.4 5
The instant procedure, however, has none of this quality of official action.
It is simply a transaction, differing in no material respect from one in which
individual X asks individual Y to exchange his holdings in Corporation A
for X's holdings in Corporation B.
It must not be thought that reorganization comprises only an alteration
in the value of a stockholder's claim or a change in the property to which
this claim relates. A plan to extend the maturity of bonds which proposes
that a class of bondholders release an obligation presently payable for a
security maturing some time in the future falls within the Commission's
definition.49 If a bondholder is to be bound by the principle of majority rule,
43. SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1271 (1938); Northern States Power
Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1355 (1938).
44. See Southern Natural Gas Company, SEC Holding Company Act Release
No. 682 (1937); Cumberland County Power and Light Company, SEC Holding Com-
pany Act Release No. 950 (1937). It is immaterial that the cash has been obtained by
a new issue of A's stock. See SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 9,3 (1938).
45. Cf. Form E-1, Rule 5(e) of the Securities Act of 1933, C. C. H. Sec. Act. Serv.
7231 (1937).
46. See Eastern Shore Gas Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 79
(1937).
47. The Commission has excluded from Section 11(g) corporate exchange offers
unaccompanied by a class vote which if successful would bind all members of the class.
San Antonio Public Service Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1630 (1939);
West Penn Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1639 (1939); New
York Power & Light Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1710 (1939).
48. See note 30, .spra.
49. See SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1432 (1939). It is immaterial
whether the method of executing the extension be the issue of new securities or the
stamping of old ones, for in both procedures an exchange is achieed. SEC v. Associated
Gas Co., 95 F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), (1938) 48 YAtz L. J. 149.
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a solicitation for his consent must conform with Section 11(g).10 Because
a plan to extend the maturity of notes lacks this fundamental element of
majority rule, the Commission has decided that proposals for note renewals
are not reorganization plans.51
It may be argued that the Commission should expand Section 11(g) to
include all changes in rights, preferences, or priorities of security holders,
since the same necessity for a full and fair disclosure of all material facts
attaches to these alterations as to the adjustments which at present constitute
a plan of reorganization; that Section 7, requiring Commission approval,
and Section 12(e), requiring solicitations be accompanied by managerial
statements of purpose and probable results, do not provide sufficient pro-
tection; that since Section 7 permits declarations to become effective unless
contrary to state laws, unfair or otherwise detrimental to investor, consumer
or public interest, the application of such a "fairness standard" compels the
Commission to confirm many plans to which it would not consent if it were
a stockholder;52 that in the absence of an explanatory report, Commission
approval may be used as a psychological inducement to obtain the consent of
security holders; and, finally, that the statements ordered by Section 12(e)
may well be worthless because, though truthful, they are too complex for
unskilled analysis., 3 Although this possible objection has all the validity of
most abstract agitation for reform, it is unsatisfactory when measured against
the practical exigencies with which the Commission is faced. Were the
Commission to extend the scope of Section 11(g), matters of vital concern
might well be submerged beneath a flood of comparatively trivial detail.
Either delay would be essential to buttress efficiency or efficiency would be
sacrificed to haste.5 4 The inevitable result would be the impairment of
goodwill and confidence upon which the success or failure of the Commission
ultimately depends. By its self-imposed limitations on the confines of Sec-
tion 11 (g), the Commission seems to have moulded the ambit of this regula-
tion to its most effective proportions.
50. See note 47, supra.
51. See Southwestern Development Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
1531 (1939) ; Portland General Electric Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1560
(1939). Nor is a proposal to reduce the interest rate on notes a plan of reorganization.
See Lone Star Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1725 (1939).
52. For a discussion of the Commission's application of this standard under Section
7, see Meck and Cary, Regulation of Corporate Finance and Management under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (1938) 52 HmAv. L. REV. 216, 247.
53. For the inadequacy of this protection, see Fortas, The Securities Act and Cor-
porate Reorganizations (1937) 4 LAW & CONTMIP. PRoB. 218, 232, el seq.; Protective
Committee Reports, pt. vii, 414.
54. The Commission has recognized the limitations on administrative efficiency. See
Protective Committee Reports, pt. VII, 3 and 901. Examination of these limitations are
contained in Buchanan, The Public Utility Holding Company Problem (1937) 25 CALiF.
L. REV. 517, 548 et seq.; Laporte, Changes in Corporate Reorganization Procedure
Proposed by the Chandler and Lea Bills (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rmv. 672, 675.
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